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THE IMPACT OF PROPOSITION 8 ON PRIOR
MISCONDUCT IMPEACHMENT EVIDENCE
IN. CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL CASES
Hank M. Goldberg*
I. INTRODUCTION
On June 8, 1982, California voters amended the California Constitu-
tion by passing Proposition 8, popularly known as the Victims' Bill of
Rights,' thereby creating potentially the most dramatic change in the
rules of evidence in the history of this state. Prior to Proposition 8, Cali-
fornia rules of evidence protected criminal defendants by restricting the
admissibility of prior misconduct impeachment evidence to felonies.2
The public, "perceiv[ing an] imbalance in favor of defendants in the rules
regarding the admissibility of evidence,"3 voted for relaxing the rules of
evidence.4
This Article discusses the two provisions of Proposition 8 added to
the constitution which have expanded the statutory rules governing ad-
missibility of prior misconduct evidence to impeach the credibility of wit-
nesses in criminal trials.5 First, section 28(f) of article 1 now allows the
admission into evidence of any prior felony "without limitation for pur-
poses of impeachment or enhancement of sentence in any criminal pro-
ceeding." 6 Second, and much more sweeping, section 28(d) of article 1,
* Hank M. Goldberg is a Deputy District Attorney for the County of Los Angeles; B.A.
UCLA (1982), J.D. Loyola of Los Angeles School of Law (1985), member California State
Bar.
1. Proposition 8 added section 28 to article 1 of the state constitution. See CAL. CONST.
art. I, § 28. Its preamble provides:
(a) The People of the State of California find and declare that the enactment of com-
prehensive provisions and laws ensuring a bill of rights for victims of crime, includ-
ing safeguards in the criminal justice system to fully protect those rights, is a matter
of grave statewide concern. The rights of victims pervade the criminal justice system,
encompassing not only the right to restitution from wrongdoers for financial losses
suffered as a result of criminal acts, but also the more basic expectation that persons
who commit felonious acts causing injury to innocent victims will be appropriately
detained in custody, tried by the courts, and sufficiently punished so that the public
safety is protected and encouraged as a goal of highest importance ....
Id. § 28(a).
2. See CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 787-788 (West 1966).
3. People v. Taylor, 180 Cal. App. 3d 622, 632, 225 Cal. Rptr. 733, 738 (1986).
4. See CAL. CoNST. art. I, § 28.
5. See CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 780-791 (West 1966).
6. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28(f). The entire section reads:
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the "Right to Truth-in-Evidence" provision, purports to make all rele-
vant evidence admissible in criminal proceedings, subject to certain enu-
merated exceptions.7
This Article examines how Proposition 8 changed the rules regard-
ing impeachment with prior convictions. It then discusses the more dra-
matic impact of Proposition 8: judicial interpretations indicating that
now even misconduct which has not resulted in a conviction (uncharged
misconduct) is also admissible for impeachment in criminal proceedings.
Finally, the author concludes that Proposition 8 has effectively brought
California evidence law into conformity with that of most other
jurisdictions.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Pre-Proposition 8 Law
Under the traditional pre-Proposition 8 rules of evidence, in crimi-
nal proceedings prior misconduct evidence was limited to prior felony
convictions,' and could be used solely for impeachment purposes.9 In
other words, before the passage of Proposition 8, if a criminal defendant
chose to testify, in certain instances, he or she could be questioned about
a prior felony conviction. This questioning was not to prove that the
defendant was a "bad person," and therefore probably guilty, but only to
prove that he or she was not credible as a witness, and that his or her
testimony should be distrusted.
1. Felony convictions
Section 788 of the California Evidence Code provides that the credi-
(f) Use of Prior Convictions. Any prior felony conviction of any person in any crim-
inal proceeding, whether adult or juvenile, shall subsequently be used without limita-
tion for purposes of impeachment or enhan6ement of sentence in any criminal
proceeding. When a prior felony conviction is an element of any felony offense, it
shall be proven to the trier of fact in open court.
Id.
7. Id. § 28(d). The section states:
Except as provided by statute hereafter enacted by a two-thirds vote of the member-
ship in each house of the Legislature, relevant evidence shall not be excluded in any
criminal proceeding, including pretrial and post-conviction motions and hearings, or
in any trial or hearing of a juvenile for a criminal offense, whether heard in juvenile
or adult court. Nothing in this section shall affect any existing statutory rule of
evidence relating to privilege or hearsay, or Evidence Code Sections 352, 782 or
1103. Nothing in this section shall affect any existing statutory or constitutional
right of the press.
Id.
8. CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 787-788 (West 1966).
9. Id. § 788.
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bility of a witness may be attacked by both cross-examining the witness
about his or her prior felony convictions and introducing records of such
convictions. 10 Before 1972, this rule was interpreted as requiring the ad-
mission of convictions for impeachment purposes, and trial courts had no
discretion to exclude them.11 The 1972 case of People v. Beagle 12 signifi-
cantly changed this rule of liberal admissibility. In Beagle, the California
Supreme Court held that section 352 of the California Evidence Code13
required trial courts to exercise discretion by weighing the unfair prejudi-
cial impact of allowing impeachment evidence of a prior felony against
the probative value of such evidence.14 The court fashioned a flexible
balancing test to aid a trial court's determination of the prior conviction's
admissibility. The four factors to be considered in the test were: (1)
whether the conviction related to the defendant's credibility; (2) the age
of the conviction; (3) whether, in the case of impeaching the defendant,
the prior conviction was for the same offense for which the defendant
was currently charged; and, (4) the impact on the trial if the defendant
did not testify out of fear of being impeached with his prior conviction.15
In a series of cases known as the "Antick line,"' 6 the California
10. Id. In pertinent part, section 788 provides that "[flor the purpose of attacking the
credibility of a witness, it may be shown by the examination of the witness or by the record of
the judgment that he had been convicted of a felony." Id.
When a witness is impeached with a felony conviction, the jury is instructed that the
conviction can be considered only for evaluating the witness's credibility. See People v. May-
field, 23 Cal. App. 3d 236, 245, 100 Cal. Rptr. 104, 109 (1972). An exemplary limiting instruc-
tion provides as follows:
The fact that a witness has been convicted of a felony, if such be a fact, may be
considered by you [jurors] only for the purpose of determining the believability of
that witness. The fact of such a conviction does not necessarily destroy or impair the
witness's believability. It is one of the circumstances that you may take into consid-
eration in weighing the testimony of such a witness.
CALIFORNIA JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CRIMINAL CALJIC No. 2.23 (5th ed. 1988).
11. See People v. House, 12 Cal. App. 3d 756, 762-63, 90 Cal. Rptr. 831, 833-34 (1970),
cited with disapproval in People v. Beagle, 6 Cal. 3d 441, 451, 492 P.2d 1, 7, 99 Cal. Rptr. 313,
319 (1972). The House court additionally ruled that requiring admission of such evidence was
constitutional. House, 12 Cal. App. 3d at 763-64, 90 Cal. Rptr. at 834-35.
12. 6 Cal. 3d 441, 492 P.2d 1, 99 Cal. Rptr. 313 (1972).
13. CAL. EVID. CODE § 352 (West 1966).
14. Beagle, 6 Cal. 3d at 451-54, 492 P.2d at 6-9, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 318-21.
15. Id. at 453, 492 P.2d at 8, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 320-21.
16. See People v. Barrick, 33 Cal. 3d 115, 122-30, 654 P.2d 1243, 1246-53, 187 Cal. Rptr.
716, 719-26 (1982) (trial court improperly allowed defendant to be impeached with a prior
conviction identical to offense for which he was on trial, even though prior was "sanitized" by
calling it "felony involving theft"); People v. Spearman, 25 Cal. 3d 107, 113-19, 599 P.2d 74,
76-80, 157 Cal. Rptr. 883, 885-90 (1979) (defendant charged with narcotics, improperly im-
peached with narcotics prior conviction which did not necessarily involve dishonesty); People
v. Fries, 24 Cal. 3d 222, 226-34, 594 P.2d 19, 22-27, 155 Cal. Rptr. 194, 197-202 (1979) (trial
court erred in allowing introduction of prior identical to offense for which accused was
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Supreme Court replaced the flexible balancing test announced in Beagle
with a rigid set of rules that greatly restricted the admissibility of prior
convictions for impeachment.' 7 First, a prosecutor could not impeach a
defendant with a prior conviction for the same or similar offense for
which he or she was currently on trial."8 The rationale for this rule was
that if the jury learned that the defendant had previously been convicted
of the same or similar type of offense, it might unjustifiably assume the
defendant to be guilty of the current charge.' 9
A second restrictive rule prohibited the admissibility of a prior con-
viction unless it involved dishonesty as a necessary element of the of-
fense.2 0 In other words, the conviction had to involve an "intent to lie,
defraud, deceive, [or] steal" bs part of the statutory definition of the
crime.2 The justification for this rule was the theory that only offenses
involving dishonesty reflect on a witness' credibility.22 Therefore, before
Proposition 8, a prior felony conviction was admissible evidence of a wit-
ness's credibility only if such conviction was not of a similar type of of-
fense as the current charge, and the convicted offense involved
dishonesty.
2. Misdemeanor convictions
Before Proposition 8, section 788 of the California Evidence Code,23
allowing impeachment with prior felony convictions, was the sole statu-
charged); People v. Woodward, 23 Cal. 3d 329, 334-42, 590 P.2d 391, 393-99, 152 Cal. Rptr.
536, 538-44 (1979) (trial court abused its discretion by allowing impeachment with prior con-
victions not involving dishonesty-voluntary manslaughter and being an ex-convict in posses-
sion of gun); People v. Rollo, 20 Cal. 3d 109, 115-21, 569 P.2d 771, 773-77, 141 Cal. Rptr. 177,
179-83 (1977) (trial courterroneously admitted only fact of defendant's conviction without
disclosing its nature); People v. Rist, 16 Cal. 3d 211, 218-23, 545 P.2d 833, 838-41, 127 Cal.
Rptr. 457, 462-65 (1976) (trial court abused its discretion in admitting prior conviction for
charge identical to that for which accused stood trial); People v. Antick, 15 Cal. 3d 79, 96-100,
539 P.2d 43, 54-56, 123 Cal. Rptr. 475, 486-88 (1975) (trial court abused it discretion in admit-
ting prior convictions because of their remoteness). These cases are discussed by the California
Supreme Court with disapproval in People v. Castro, 38 Cal. 3d 301, 307-13, 696 P.2d 111,
114-18, 211 Cal. Rptr. 719, 722-25 (1985).
17. Castro, 38 Cal. 3d at 307, 696 P.2d at 114, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 722.
18. Fries, 24 Cal. 3d at 230, 594 P.2d at 25, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 200; Rist, 16 Cal. 3d at 220-
21, 545 P.2d at 839-40, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 463-64.
19. Fries, 24 Cal. 3d at 227-30, 594 P.2d at 23-25, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 198-200.
20. Spearman, 25 Cal. 3d at 114, 599 P.2d at 77, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 886.
21. Id. Neither voluntary manslaughter nor possession of a concealable firearm involve
dishonesty as an element. Id.
22. Id.
23. CAL. EVID. CODE § 788 (West 1966). See supra note 10 and accompanying text for a
discussion of this Evidence Code provision.
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tory exception to the general rule codified in section 78724 precluding
admissibility of specific instances of conduct to attack or support credi-
bility.2" Thus, except for felony convictions, all evidence of specific in-
stances of conduct, including misdemeanor convictions, was
inadmissible.
3. Uncharged misconduct
Prior to Proposition 8, California followed the rule of a small minor-
ity of jurisdictions that specified instances of conduct could not be used
to impeach or bolster a witness's credibility unless such conduct resulted
in a felony conviction.2 6 Such cross-examination was improper even
where the defendant was the first to raise the subject of his or her charac-
ter, thereby "opening the door" to cross-examination about bad charac-
ter traits.27 This rule was codified in section 787 of the California
Evidence Code.
28
B. Proposition 8
Proposition 8 has had a major impact on the rules regarding admis-
sibility of felony and misdemeanor convictions, as well as the rules re-
garding the scope of cross-examination on prior convictions. Both
section 23(f) and section 23(d) of article 1 dramatically affect the admis-
sibility of prior misconduct evidence on the issue of witness credibility.
Specifically, section 28(d) effects a pro tanto repeal of all statutorily and
judicially created rules of evidence which would limit the admissibility of
relevant evidence except those provisions which are expressly
preserved.9
1. Text of Proposition 8
Proposition 8 is "[d]esigned as an omnibus package of criminal jus-
tice legislation cover[ing] areas including insanity, plea bargaining proce-
dures, school safety, habitual felon statutes, bail practices and the
24. CAL. EVID. CODE § 787 (West 1966). This section provides: "Subject to Section 788,
evidence of specific instances of his conduct relevant only as tending to prove a trait of his
character is inadmissible to attack or support the credibility of a witness." Id.
25. Antick, 15 Cal. 3d at 96-100, 539 P.2d at 54-56, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 486-88.
26. See infra notes 135-36 and accompanying text.
27. People v. Thomas, 206 Cal. App. 3d 689, 700-01 n.6, 254 Cal. Rptr. 15, 22-23 n.6
(1988).
28. CAL. EVID. CODE § 787 (West 1966).
29. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28(d).
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
exclusionary rule."3 This Article focuses on two provisions expanding
the rules of evidence.
Section 28(d), the "Right to Truth-in-Evidence" provision, states
that "[e]xcept as provided by statute hereafter enacted by a two-thirds
vote of the membership in each house of the Legislature, relevant evi-
dence shall not be excluded in any criminal proceeding, including pretrial
and post-conviction motions and hearings, or any trial or hearing of a
juvenile for a criminal offense, whether heard in juvenile or adult
court."1
3 1
Section 28(f) of Proposition 8 makes "[a]ny prior felony conviction
... whether adult or juvenile, shall subsequently be used without limita-
tion for purposes of impeachment or enhancement of sentence in any
criminal proceeding. When a prior felony conviction is an element of
any felony offense, it shall be proven to the trier of fact in open court."32
2. Procedural implementation of Proposition 8
The right of voters to propose statutes and amendments to the Cali-
fornia Constitution and to adopt or reject them is expressed in the Cali-
fornia Constitution.33 A proposition is a proposed initiative which
allows the electorate to amend the California Constitution.34 It may only
contain a single subject.3 5 The Secretary then submits the proposition at
the next general election or at any special statewide election that may be
held prior to the general election.3 6 The Governor has the authority to
call a special statewide election for the proposition.
3 7
3. Purpose of Proposition 8
Proposition 8, suggesting major changes in both the constitution and
the statutes of California, was proposed by Paul Gann in 1982.38 One
purpose of Proposition 8, "The Victims' Bill of Rights," is to protect the
victims of crimes by ensuring "that persons who commit felonious acts
causing injury to innocent victims will be appropriately detained in cus-
30. CALIFORNIA COUNCIL ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STATE TASK FORCE ON VICTIMS'
RIGHTS viii (1988).
31. CAL. CONST. art I, § 28(d).
32. Id. § 28(f).
33. Id. art. II, § 8.
34. Id. § 8(b).
35. Id. § 8(d).
36. Id. § 8(c).
37. Id.
38. ASSEMBLY COMM. ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE, ANALYSIS OF PROPOSITION 8: THE CRIM-
INAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE 30 (1982).
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tody, tried by the courts, and sufficiently punished... ."I' Section 28(d)
ensures this end by relaxing previous restrictions on the admissibility of
relevant evidence. 4° Accordingly, Proposition 8 purports to require the
use of prior felony convictions against a criminal defendant if he or she
chooses to testify.4 1
Additionally, Proposition 8 promotes placing all relevant evidence
before the jury.4 2 Specifically, California voters sought to "overcome
some of the adverse decisions of [the] higher courts. '43 For instance,
evidentiary rules creating rights for the criminally accused and placing
restrictions on law enforcement officers no longer compel exclusion of
unlawfully seized evidence from a criminal trial.'
III. THE IMPACT OF PROPOSITION 8 ON RULES REGARDING
IMPEACHMENT WITH PRIOR CONVICTIONS
A. Felony Convictions
Proposition 8 effected a major change on the rules regarding admis-
sibility of felony and misdemeanor convictions, as well as the rules re-
garding the scope of cross-examination on prior convictions. Section
28(f) of Proposition 8 makes "[a]ny prior felony conviction" admissible
for impeachment "without limitation."'45
1. Effect of Proposition 8 on the admissibility of felony convictions
Against the backdrop of the highly restrictive pre-Proposition 8
rules limiting the admissibility of prior felonies for impeachment pur-
poses,' California voters passed Proposition 8 amending section 28(f)
39. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28(a).
40. People v. Taylor, 180 Cal. App. 3d 622, 632, 225 Cal. Rptr. 733, 738 (1986).
41. ASSEMBLY COMM. ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 38, at 30.
42. Id. at 31; see In re Lance W., 37 Cal. 3d 873, 889, 694 P.2d 744, 754, 210 Cal. Rptr.
631, 641 (1985).
43. CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAMPHLET, PRIMARY ELECTION JuNE 8, 1982, 34-35 (argu-
ments in favor of Proposition 8 and rebuttal to arguments) [hereinafter CALIFORNIA BALLOT
PAMPHLET].
44. Lance W., 37 Cal. 3d at 888, 694 P.2d at 753, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 640.
45. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28(f).
46. See supra notes 10-22 and accompanying text for a discussion of the pre-Proposition 8
rules regarding felony convictions. Ballot summary and argument materials presented to the
electorate in connection with a particular measure can be used to determine the electorate's
intent in passing a measure. United States v. Castro, 38 Cal. 3d 301, 310, 696 P.2d 111, 116,
211 Cal. Rptr. 719, 724 (1985). The ballot materials in connection with Proposition 8 pro-
vided: "The measure would amend the State Constitution to require that information about
prior felony convictions be used without limitation to discredit the testimony of a witness,
including that of a defendant. Under current law, such information may be used only under
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which provides for the admission of "any felony . . . without limita-
tion."'47 Although this language seems absolute, the California Supreme
Court interpreted it rather narrowly in the case of People v. Castro.4 In
Castro, the defendant, charged with receiving stolen property, was im-
peached with prior convictions of simple possession of heroin and posses-
sion of heroin for sale.49
In determining the propriety of the impeachment, the California
Supreme Court placed two important limitations on section 28(f)'s man-
date that all prior felonies be admitted without limitation. First, the
court determined that California voters did not really intend to deprive a
trial court of its discretion to exclude evidence of prior felonies under
section 35250 when its prejudicial effect outweighed its probative value.51
The court reasoned that California voters only intended to overrule the
restrictive Antick line of cases, which created rigid black letter rules of
admissibility, and to restore trial courts' discretion to determine the ad-
missibility of a prior conviction. 2 This result allegedly steered "clear of
constitutional obstacles" which presumably ivould be created if courts
had no discretion to limit prior felony impeachment.5 3 This threat of
limited circumstances." CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAMPHLET, supra note 43, at 54 (analysis by
Legislative analyst).
The court in Castro interpreted the last sentence of the above-quoted statement in the
ballot materials as constituting a "clear reference to the Antick line of cases." Castro, 38 Cal.
3d at 311, 696 P.2d at 116, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 724. Hence, the court concluded that the voters
only intended to abrogate the Antick line of cases, and not eliminate trial court's discretion to
exclude prior convictions under section 352 of the California Evidence Code. Id. This analy-
sis seems absurd because it should not be presumed that the average voter even knew of the
existence of the Antick line of cases. The court's analysis is also contrary to the plain language
of the ballot materials stating that the measure would "require" the admission of prior felony
convictions "without limitation." See CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAMPHLET, supra note 43, at 54.
The average voter reading such language would have probably concluded that, under subdivi-
sion (f), courts would be required to admit such evidence. Moreover, settled rules of constitu-
tional construction "show that the primary effect of subdivision (f) is to overrule Beagle,
thereby removing the discretion of the trial court to exclude evidence of prior felony convic-
tions." Comment, Impeaching the Accused with Prior Convictions: Does Proposition 8 Put Bea.
gle in the Doghouse, 15 PAC. L.J. 302, 310 (1984). According to the Assembly Committee on
Criminal Justice, Proposition 8 requires "the use of prior felony convictions for impeachment
purposes even though the probative value is outweighed by the danger of substantial preju-
dice." ASSEMBLY COMM. ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 38, at 31.
47. See CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28(f).
48. 38 Cal. 3d 301, 696 P.2d 111, 211 Cal. Rptr. 719 (1985).
49. Id. at 302, 696 P.2d at 112, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 720.
50. CAL. EVID. CODE § 352 (West 1966).
51. Castro, 38 Cal. 3d at 313, 696 P.2d at 117, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 725.
52. Id. For a more detailed explanation of how the court determined the voters' intent,
see supra notes 38-44 and accompanying text.
53. Castro, 38 Cal. 3d at 313, 696 P.2d at 117-18, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 725-26. The court
noted the conflicting language in Proposition 8. While section 28(f) allowed all prior felonies
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unconstitutionality, however, appears to be more fabricated than real,
because the Castro plurality failed to cite a single authority for this novel
proposition.
5 4
The Castro court placed a second limitation on section 28(f), hold-
ing that a trial court could only allow impeachment with a prior felony
involving "moral turpitude" or a readiness to do evil."5 The court rea-
soned that felony convictions not evidencing moral turpitude bear no ra-
tional relationship to a witness's readiness to lie. 56 The due process
requirements of the United States Constitution 7 demand that evidence
admitted against a defendant be relevant. 58 Consequently, the court rea-
soned that admitting prior felonies not involving moral turpitude would
violate due process because such felonies are irrelevant.5 9
Applying these limitations to the facts of the case, the Castro court
found that, although possession of narcotics for sale involves moral turpi-
tude, simple possession of narcotics does not.' ° Therefore, the California
Supreme Court held that the trial court erred in admitting the simple
possession conviction and erred in stating that it had no discretion to
determine the admissibility of the possession of narcotics for sale convic-
tion.61 The conviction was affirmed because the error in impeaching the
to be admitted without limitation, section 28(d) seemed to indicate that the proposition was
not intended to affect certain existing rules of admissibility which conflicted with section 28(f).
Id at 309-10, 696 P.2d at 115, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 723.
54. Moreover, statutes in a majority of states limit trial court discretion, and these statutes
have passed constitutional muster. See infra note 64 and accompanying text.
55. Castro, 38 Cal. 3d at 313, 696 P.2d at 117-18, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 725-26. The term
"moral turpitude" escapes precise definition. Nevertheless,
[m]oral turpitude has been described as an "act of baseness, vileness or depravity in
the private and social duties which a man owes to his fellowmen, or to society in
general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man
and man." It has been described as any crime or misconduct without excuse or any
dishonest or immoral act. The meaning and test is the same whether the dishonest or
immoral act is a felony, misdemeanor, or no crime at all.
Chadwick v. State Bar, 49 Cal. 3d 103, 110, 776 P.2d 240, 244-45, 260 Cal. Rptr. 538, 542-43
(1989) (citations omitted) (quoting 1 B. WrrKiN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE § 375, at 425 (3d
ed. 1985)).
56. Castro, 38 Cal. 3d at 314, 696 P.2d at 119, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 727.
57. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
58. Castro, 38 Cal. 3d at 313, 696 P.2d at 117-18, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 725-26.
59. Id. at 317, 696 P.2d at 121, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 729.
60. Id.
61. Id. The court recognized that it may be difficult to determine exactly which felonies
involve moral turpitude and which do not. Id. at 316 & n.1l, 696 P.2d at 120 & n.11, 211 Cal.
Rptr. at 728 & n.11. The court, however, pointed to a number of authorities which might
prove helpful on this point. Id. at 316 n.l, 696 P.2d at 120 n.l, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 728 n.ll
(citing I B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE § 195 (2d ed. 1970); Annotation, What Consti-
tutes "Crime Involving Moral Turpitude" Within Meaning of §§ 212(a)(9) and 241(a)(4) of
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defendant with the simple possession prior was deemed harmless.62
Dissenting in Castro, Justice Lucas disagreed with the plurality's
two limitations on section 28(f). Lucas concluded that the California
voters did intend to abrogate the trial court's discretion authorized by
section 352 to exclude prior felonies.63 Moreover, contrary to the asser-
tions of the plurality, removing a trial court's discretion to exclude prior
felonies has passed constitutional muster in other states.64 Few jurisdic-
tions outside California follow the rule announced in Castro that courts
always have the discretion to exclude prior felony convictions.65 In fact,
Immigration and Naturalization Act and Similar Predecessor Statutes Providing for Exclusion
of Deportation of Aliens Convicted of Such Crime, 23 A.L.R. FED. 480 (1975)).
62. Castro, 38 Cal. 3d at 319, 696 P.2d at 122, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 730.
63. Id. at 322-23, 696 P.2d at 125, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 732 (Lucas, J., dissenting).
64. See, e.g., Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 560-61 (1967) (Court observed in dicta that
use of prior convictions for impeachment purposes was constitutional); People v. Meyers, 617
P.2d 808, 812 (Colo. 1980) (Colorado's impeachment rule that precludes any exercise of trial
court discretion in admitting felony prior convictions does not deprive defendants of due pro-
cess of law); People v. Henry, 195 Colo. 309, 315-16, 579 P.2d 1041, 1044-45 (1978) (Colo-
rado's impeachment rule held constitutional); Thompson v. United States, 546 A.2d 414, 425-
26 (D.C. 1988) (upholding District of Columbia's impeachment statute); Dixon v. United
States, 287 A.2d 89 (D.C.), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 926 (1972) ("We are not persuaded that
juries are so prone to ignore or misinterpret appropriate limiting instructions on this type of
evidence that the fifth and sixth amendments require that the trial judge retain some discretion
to exclude any prior convictions."); State v. Prather, 290 So. 2d 840, 842 (La. 1974) (Louisiana
statute permitting use of prior convictions of felonies to impeach held constitutional); People v.
Allen, 429 Mich. 558, 573 n.10, 420 N.W.2d 499, 507 n. 10 (concluding that modifying its rules
of evidence regarding impeachment with prior convictions to remove trial court's discretion to
exclude certain offenses was question of "[p]olicy, not constitutional limitations"); State v.
Ross, 295 N.C. 488, 492-93, 246 S.E.2d 780, 784 (1978) (North Carolina statute allowing
impeachment with prior unrelated felony convictions held not unconstitutional); State v. Ru-
zicka, 89 Wash. 2d 217, 225, 570 P.2d 1208, 1212 (1977) (upholding former Washington law
requiring admission of any crime for impeachment with no trial court discretion).
Only one jurisdiction has come to the conclusion that the use of prior felony convictions
for impeachment purposes is unconstitutional. See State v. Santiago, 53 Haw. 254, 492 P.2d
657 (1971) (impeachment of defendant with prior felony convictions unconstitutional under
any circumstances in criminal case). No American jurisdiction has been willing to follow Ha-
waii's lead. See Beaver & Marques, A Proposal to Modify the Rule on Criminal Conviction
Impeachment, 58 TEMP. L.Q. 585, 589 (1985).
65. The majority of jurisdictions have adopted Federal Rule of Evidence 609(a), FED. R.
EVID. 609(a), regarding impeachment with prior convictions. Beaver & Marques, supra note
64, at 587. Rule 609(a) provides:
For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence that he [or she] has
been convicted of a crime shall be admitted if elicited from the witness or established
by public record during cross-examination but only if the crime (1) was punishable
by death or imprisonment in excess of one year under the law under which the wit-
ness was convicted, and the court determines that the probative value of admitting
this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the defendant, or (2) involved dishon-
esty or false statement, regardless of the punishment.
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most jurisdictions, by adopting Federal Rule of Evidence 609(a), 66 ex-
plicitly deprive courts of discretion to limit impeachment with prior fel-
ony convictions in many instances.6 7
Justice Lucas also disagreed with the plurality's conclusion that
only felonies involving moral turpitude can be admitted constitution-
FED. R. EvID. 609(a) (emphasis added).
The conference report on Rule 609(a) makes it clear that the Rule deprives trial courts of
discretion to exclude crimes involving dishonesty and false statement:
The admission of prior convictions involving dishonesty and false statement is not
within the discretion of the Court. Such convictions are peculiarly probative of cred-
ibility and, under this rule, are always to be admitted. Thus, judicial discretion
granted with respect to admissibility of other prior convictions is not applicable to
those involving dishonesty or false statement.
H.R. REp. No. 1597, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 9, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 7098, 7103.
For a more extensive history of the enactment of Rule 609, see 3 J. WEINsrEIN & M.
BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 609(l)-(5) (1988).
66. Kg., LA. CODE EVID. ANN. art. 609.1 (West 1990); N.C. GEN. STAT. ch. 8c, rule
609(a) (1983); OR. REV. STAT. § 147.405 (1989) (amending OR. R. EVID. 609(1)(a) (1987));
TEx. EvID. & APP. PROC. ANN. 609(a) (Vernon 1989); see supra note 65.
A number of jurisdictions which do not specifically follow Rule 609(a) otherwise limit a
court's discretion to preclude impeachment with prior convictions. See, eg., COLO. REV.
STAT. § 13-90-101 (1987) ("conviction of any person of any felony may be shown for the
purpose of affecting the credibility of such witness"); People v. Wright, 678 P.2d 1072, 1074
(Colo. Ct. App. 1984) (interpreting section 13-90-101 as depriving discretion to foreclose use of
felony conVictions for impeachment); D.C. CODE ANN. § 14-305 (1981) ("evidence that the
witness has been convicted of a criminal offense shall be admitted if offered" if offense consti-
tutes either felony or non-felony which involves dishonesty or false statement); MD. CTS. &
JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 10-905 (1984) ("evidence is admissible to prove the interest of a
witness in any proceeding, or the fact of his conviction of an infamous crime"); Prout v. State,
311 Md. 348, 364, 535 A.2d 445, 452-53 (1988) (court has discretion to determine admissibility
of non-infamous crimes); Wicks v. Maryland, 311 Md. 376, 379, 535 A.2d 459, 460 (1988)
(courts have no discretion to limit impeachment with infamous crimes); Allen, 429 Mich. at
558, 420 N.W.2d at 499 (Michigan Supreme Court used its rule-making power to amend Rule
609(a)(1) of the Michigan Rules of Evidence, which previously provided that courts had dis-
cretion to exclude any crime regardless of whether or not it involved dishonesty or false state-
ment, to conform to federal provision that courts have no discretion to disallow impeachment
with crimes containing "an element of dishonesty or false statement"); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 491.050 (Vernon 1952) ("Any person who has been convicted of a crime is, notwithstanding,
a competent witness; however, any prior criminal conviction may be proved to affect his credi-
bility in a civil or criminal case."); State v. Griffin, 640 S.W.2d 128, 132 (Mo. 1982) (interpret-
ing section 491.050 as conferring absolute right to show prior convictions for impeachment);
State v. Morris, 460 S.W.2d 624, 629 (Mo. 1970) (trial courts have no discretion to limit such
impeachment); State v. Shisler, 752 S.W.2d 447,451 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988) (trial courts have no
discretion to limit such impeachment); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-17-25 (1985) ("conviction or sen-
tence for any crime or misdemeanor may be shown to affect credibility"); State v. Moretti, 521
A.2d 1003, 1011 (R.I. 1987) (interpreting section 9-17-25 as creating right to impeach wit-
ness's credibility by showing his prior convictions "regardless of the possible prejudice" result-
ing from such impeachment).
67. See supra note 65 for a discussion of FED. R. EID. 609(a).
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ally. 68 Lucas opined that all prior felonies are admissible "on the theory
that the commission of a felony offense necessarily bears on one's credi-
bility regardless of the nature of that offense.",69 Since most jurisdictions
have adopted Federal Rule of Evidence 609(a), 70 evidence of all felony
convictions is admissible in most jurisdictions. 71 The plurality did not
68. Castro, 38 Cal. 3d at 323, 896 P.2d at 125, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 732-33 (Lucas, J.,
dissenting).
69. Id. Indeed, Lucas's position is well taken. In fact, it is supported by the behavioral
sciences.
The behavioral sciences support the view that any criminal conviction is relevant to credi-
bility. For example, according to the American Psychiatric Association, the diagnostic criteria
for a person with an anti-social (criminal) personality disorder include:
fail[ing] to conform to social norms with respect to lawful behavior, as indicated by
repeatedly performing anti-social acts that are grounds for arrest (whether arrested
or not), e.g. destroying property, harassing others, stealing, pursuing an illegal occu-
pation... [having] no regard for the truth, as indicated by repeated lying, use of
aliases, or "conning" others for personal profit or pleasure ....
AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL Dis-
ORDERS 345 (3d ed. 1987); see also Allen, 429 Mich. at 677 n.10, 420 N.W.2d at 553 n.10
(Boyle, J., dissenting) (discussing behavioral literature).
70. See supra note 65.
71. Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, any felony is potentially admissible for impeach-
ment. FED. R. EVID. 609(a). However, unlike the inflexible approach taken by the Castro
plurality, under Rule 609(a) courts do have discretion to exclude felonies which do not involve
dishonesty or false statement. Id. 609(a)(2); H.R. REP. No. 1597, supra note 65, at 9, re-
printed in U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS. For example, courts in jurisdictions following
Rule 609(a) have allowed impeachment with priors involving simple possession of narcotics.
See, eg., United States v. Barnes, 622 F.2d 107, 108-09 (5th Cir. 1980) (possession of heroin
admissible for impeachment); State v. Jackson, 139 Ariz. 213, 215, 677 P.2d 1321, 1323 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 1983) (possession of dangerous drugs admissible for impeachment); People v. Mar-
tin, 150 Mich. App. 630, 635-37, 389 N.W.2d 713, 715-16 (1986) (possession of heroin admis-
sible for impeachment). These cases are directly contrary to the Castro court's holding that
simple possession of narcotics does not involve moral turpitude and is, therefore, constitution.
ally inadmissible for impeachment. See Castro, 38 Cal. 3d at 313-17, 696 P.2d at 118-21, 211
Cal. Rptr. at 725-29.
The advisory committee's note to the Proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 609 for the
United States District Courts and Magistrates provides:
While it may be argued that considerations of relevancy should limit provable con-
victions to those of crimes of untruthfulness, acts are constituted major crimes be-
cause they entail substantial injury to and disregard of the rights of other persons or
the public. A demonstrated instance of willingness to engage in conduct in disregard
of accepted patterns is translatable into a willingness to give false testimony.
COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE
UNITED STATES, PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED RULES OF EVIDENCE FOR THE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS AND MAGISTRATE'S PROPOSED FED. R. EVID. 609(A)
advisory committee note 125 (1969).
Moreover, a number of jurisdictions which do not follow the federal rule allow impeach-
ment with prior convictions that do not involve moral turpitude. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 13-90-101 (1990) ("any felony" admissible for impeachment); D.C. CODE ANN. § 14-
305(b)(B) (1990) (all felonies and misdemeanors involving "dishonesty and false statement"
admissible for impeachment); Thompson v. United States, 546 A.2d 414, 425 n.21 (D.C. 1988)
("dishonesty and false statement" broadly construed to include all misdemeanors not resulting
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cite a single authority for its assertion that the United States Constitution
limits the admissibility of prior felonies for impeachment to those involv-
ing moral turpitude.72 In fact, authorities are solidly to the contrary-
there is no constitutional requirement that only felonies involving moral
turpitude be admissible.73
Because of the major change in the California Supreme Court's
composition since Castro,74 the plurality position in Castro may no
longer represent the court's majority opinion and Lucas's position may
soon become the law. As the California Supreme Court recently stated:
"Our Castro decision.., rejected the overwhelming weight of appellate
authority and consciously declined to accept the apparent plain meaning
from passion or short temper); Ross v. United States, 520 A.2d 1064, 1065 (D.C. 1987) ("dis-
honesty and false statement" broadly construed to exclude only crimes involving passion and
short temper); LA. CODE CRIM. PRoc. ANN. art. 609.1(A) (West 1990) ("criminal convic-
tions" admissible for impeachment); MD. CODE ANN. § 10-905 (all crimes admissible); MASS.
ANN. LAWS ch. 233, § 21 (Law. Co-op. 1986) ("The conviction of a witness of a crime may be
shown to affect his credibility."); Commonwealth v. Scalley, 17 Mass. App. 224, 231-32, 437
N.E.2d 298, 303 (1983) (defendant properly impeached with driving-under-the-influence
prior); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 491.050 (Vernon 1989) ("any prior criminal convictions" admissible
for impeachment); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 516:33 (1974) ("No person shall be incompetent
to testify on account of his having been convicted of an infamous crime, but the record of such
conviction may be used to affect his credit as a witness."); State v. Brooks, 126 N.H. 618, 625,
495 A.2d 1258, 1263 (1985) (crimes admissible even if they do not involve lack of veracity);
State v. Duke, 100 N.H. 292, 123 A.2d 745 (1956) (defendant can be impeached with convic-
tions of drunkenness, disorderly conduct, driving under the influence, and escape from house
of corrections); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 400.40 (McKinney 1990) (crimes not necessarily
involving moral turpitude admissible); N.C. GEN. STAT. ch. 8c, rule 609(a) (defendant can be
impeached with "conviction of a crime punishable by more than 60 days confinement"); OR.
REv. STAT. § 40.355(1)(b), Rule 609 (1989) (all felonies and those misdemeanors involving
false statement or dishonesty admissible); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-17-15 (1985) ("any crime or
misdemeanor" admissible); TEx. EVID. & ApP. PROC. ANN. 609(a) (Vernon 1989) (allowing
impeachment "if the crime was a felony or involved moral turpitude, regardless of
punishment").
72. See Castro, 38 Cal. 3d at 313-14, 696 P.2d at 118-19, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 726-27.
73. See, eg., Spencer, 385 U.S. at 562-63 (U.S. Constitution interpreted by courts as mak-
ing question of evidentiary rules regarding impeachment with priors question of state policy
and not question of constitutional law); Henry, 195 Colo. at 315-16, 579 P.2d at 1044-45;
Prather, 290 So. 2d at 842; Burell v. State, 42 Md. App. 130, 153-54, 399 A.2d 1354, 1367
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1979); State v. Jesse, 378 S.W.2d 597, 597-98 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987); People
v. Sandoval, 34 N.Y.2d 371, 378, 314 N.E.2d 413, 418, 357 N.Y.S.2d 849, 856 (1974); Ross,
295 N.C. at 492-93, 246 S.E.2d at 784; Coats v. State, 589 P.2d 693, 697 (Okla. Crim. App.
1978) (upholding former law allowing impeachment with any felony); Ruzicka, 89 Wash. 2d at
225-35, 570 P.2d 1208, 1210-17 (1977) (upholding former Washington law requiring admission
of any crime for impeachment with no trial court discretion).
74. When Castro was decided, the court was composed of Chief Justice Bird and Justices
Mosk, Kaus, Broussard, Reynoso, Grodan and Lucas. The court is now composed of Chief
Justice Lucas and Justices Mosk, Broussard, Paneili, Eagleson, Arabian and Kennard.
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of the constitutional language [of Proposition 8]." 75 For now, however,
under Castro, a prior conviction is not admissible for impeachment un-
less it involves moral turpitude, and the trial court retains discretion to
determine whether such evidence should be admitted.
B. Misdemeanor Convictions
With regard to misdemeanor convictions, section 28(d), like section
28(f) for felony convictions, entirely changed California law regarding
impeachment with prior misdemeanor convictions.
1. Effect of Proposition 8 on the admissibility of misdemeanor
convictions
The California Supreme Court, in People v. Harris,76 held that the
"Right to Truth-in-Evidence" provision nullifies section 787 of the Cali-
fornia Evidence Code77 in criminal cases.7" In Harris, the defendant was
charged with special circumstance felony murder.79 As part of its case,
the prosecution called as a witness a paid informant, who had worked for
the police in narcotics cases in the past. 0 The informant testified that
the defendant had confessed to him." To bolster the informant's credi-
bility, a narcotics detective was called to testify that the informant was
reliable in past cases.8 2 Moreover, the prosecution offered specific in-
stances of the informant's prior conduct to bolster his credibility as a
witness.8 3 Prior to Proposition 8, such evidence would have violated sec-
tion 787, which prohibited the introduction of evidence of specific in-
stances of conduct to attack or support a witness's credibility.84 The
Harris court, however, held that "section 28(d) effected a pro tanto re-
peal" of section 787.85 The court also noted that "section 28(d) contains
no... exception that would preserve the exclusionary rule of Evidence
Code sections 786 [to] 790.''s6 Rather, the court explained that section
75. People v. Turner, 50 Cal. 3d 668, 703, 789 P.2d 887, 906, 268 Cal. Rptr. 706, 725
(1990).
76. 47 Cal. 3d 1047, 767 P.2d 619, 255 Cal. Rptr. 352 (1989).
77. CAL. EvID. CODE § 787 (West 1966).
78. Harris, 47 Cal. 3d at 1080, 767 P.2d at 640-41, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 373-74.
79. Id. at 1055, 767 P.2d at 623, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 356 (murder was committed in prepara-
tion of robbery and kidnapping).
80. Id. at 1059-60, 767 P.2d at 626, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 359.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 1068, 767 P.2d at 640, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 373.
83. Id.
84. See CAL, EVID. CODE § 787 (West 1966).
85. Harris, 47 Cal. 3d at 1081-82, 767 P.2d at 640, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 373.
86. Id. at 1081, 767 P.2d at 640, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 373.
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28(d) expresses the electorate's intent that "both judicially created and
statutory rules restraining admission of relevant evidence in criminal
cases be repealed except insofar as 28(d) expressly preserves them."
'8 7
In another section of the Harris opinion, the court specifically dis-
cussed misdemeanor convictions.88 The trial court had refused to allow
the defense to impeach a prosecution witness by reference to his misde-
meanor probation. 9 The court recognized that under former law, im-
peachment with misdemeanor convictions was improper.90 It observed,
however, that "because section 28(d) now makes all relevant evidence
admissible in criminal proceedings except as provided in that section, the
evidence is not inadmissible unless it is excluded pursuant to Evidence
Code section 352."' 9' The court, however, found that the trial judge did'
not abuse his discretion in excluding such impeachment under section
352 of the California Evidence Code.92 The clear implication of Harris,
nevertheless, is that trial courts can now use their discretion to allow
impeachment with evidence of misdemeanor convictions.93
After Proposition 8, no prohibition on the introduction of misde-
meanor convictions remains because section 28(d) repealed section 787.14
However, since section 28(d), which makes misdemeanor convictions ad-
missible, expressly preserved section 352 of the Evidence Code,95 a trial
court may exclude a misdemeanor conviction if its probative value is ex-
ceeded by its prejudicial effect.96 Therefore, even if the California
Supreme Court overturns Castro and interprets section 28(f) as making
felony convictions admissible "without limitation," trial courts will still
be able to exclude misdemeanor convictions pursuant to section 352 of
the Evidence Code.
97
87. Id. at 1082, 767 P.2d at 641, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 374.
88. Id. at 1090-92, 767 P.2d at 646-48, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 379-81.
89. Id. at 1090, 767 P.2d at 646, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 379.
90. Id., 767 P.2d at 646, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 379-80.
91. Id. at 1090-91 n.22, 767 P.2d at 647 n.22, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 380 n.22 (referring to CAL.
EVID. CODE § 352 (West 1966)).
92. Id. at 1081, 767 P.2d at 640, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 373; CAL. EVID. CODE § 352 (West
1966).
93. Harris has been interpreted in two appellate decisions to allow impeachment with evi-
dence of misdemeanor convictions. See, ag., People v. Bloodsaw, 224 Cal. App. 3d 1610, 1612,
274 Cal. Rptr. 653, 654 (1990) (misdemeanors admissible under Harris and "Right to Truth-
in-Evidence" provision); People v. Pinkins, 223 Cal. App. 3d 69a, 69c-d (1990) (misdemeanor
convictions evincing moral turpitude admissible).
94. See Harris, 47 Cal. 3d at 1081-82, 767 P.2d at 640, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 373.
95. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28(d).
96. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 352 (West 1966).
97. See Harris, 47 Cal. 3d at 1081, 767 P.2d at 640, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 373. Because Cali-
fornia had not previously allowed misdemeanors to be admitted for impeachment purposes,
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2. Effect of People v. Castro on the admissibility of misdemeanor
convictions
Assuming that the plurality's assertion in People v. Castro 9 that
admission of prior felony convictions not evidencing "moral turpitude"
would violate due process is still good law,99 it follows that only misde-
meanors evidencing "moral turpitude" currently are admissible in Cali-
fornia. 1"° If, however, Justice Lucas's dissenting opinion in Castro-
noting that due process does not limit admissibility of prior convictions
to offenses involving moral turpitude' 01-becomes law, it is unclear the
extent to which misdemeanors will become admissible. Several possibili-
ties, however, are evidenced by the laws of other states.
For example, the North Carolina Supreme Court has ruled that all
crimes are relevant to credibility.' 2 Even traffic offenses, such as exceed-
ing the speed limit or disregarding a stop sign, are considered to be re-
lated to credibility.' 03 The North Carolina Supreme Court rationalized
there is an absence of California authorities defining which misdemeanors involve moral turpi-
tude and which do not.
The problem of determining which misdemeanors involve moral turpitude is not as great
as it may seem. Crimes which involve dishonesty as a necessary element of the crime are more
relevant to credibility than those crimes which do not necessarily involve dishonesty. People v.
Castro, 38 Cal. 3d 301, 315, 696 P.2d 111, 119, 211 Cal. Rptr. 719, 727 (1985). Therefore,
misdemeanors involving dishonesty or false statement would clearly be admissible. See, e.g.,
CAL. PENAL CODE § 148.5(a) (West 1988) (filing false police report); id. § 148.9(a) (false
representation of identity to police officer); CAL. VEH. CODE § 20 (West 1987) (false state-
ment to Department of Motor Vehicles).
The determination of whether a crime involves moral turpitude is based solely upon an
analysis of the legal elements of the offense. Castro, 38 Cal. 3d at 317, 696 P.2d at 120, 211
Cal. Rptr. at 728. A number of offenses, commonly known as "wobblers" by California crimi-
nal practitioners, can be filed either as felonies or misdemeanors in the discretion of the prose-
cutor. CAL. PENAL CODE § 17(b)(4) (West 1988). The legal elements of such offenses are the
same whether they are filed as felonies or misdemeanors. Id. Thus, a wobbler offense filed as a
felony, which has been held to involve moral turpitude, also involves moral turpitude if filed as
a misdemeanor.
98. 38 Cal. 3d 301, 696 P.2d 111, 211 Cal. Rptr. 719 (1985).
99. Id. at 322-23, 696 P.2d at 124-25, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 732-33 (Lucas, J., concurring and
dissenting).
100. The court in Castro based its conclusion on the concept that crimes of moral turpitude
evidence a general "readiness to do evil" from which the jury may infer a readiness to lie. Id.
at 314, 696 P.2d at 118, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 726. Therefore, the argument would apply equally to
misdemeanor offenses as the focus is not on the severity of the crime but on the "readiness to
do evil" of a crime evidencing moral turpitude.
101. Id. at 323, 696 P.2d at 125, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 733 (Lucas, J., concurring and dissent-
ing). Justice Lucas recognized that there "may exist some federal due process restriction upon
the kind of prior convictions deemed relevant for impeachment purposes." Id. (Lucas, J.,
concurring and dissenting). 1
102. Ingle v. Roy Stone Transfer Corp., 271 N.C. 276, 282, 156 S.E.2d 265, 270 (1967).
103. Id.
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the relevance of such violations by commenting that no one "who con-
sistently violates motor vehicle laws designed to protect life and property
on the highway can claim an unblemished general character."" °
New York's approach concerning the admissibility of prior convic-
tions can be characterized as a middle ground between those jurisdictions
allowing any crime whatsoever to be admitted,1"5 and those jurisdictions
which allow only crimes involving moral turpitude to be admitted.'0 6
New York's highest court has ruled that a prior crime is admissible if it
shows a "willingness or disposition on the part of the particular defend-
ant voluntarily to place the advancement of his [or her] individual self-
interest ahead of principle or of the interests of society." 1 7 Under this
standard, a wide variety of misdemeanor and infraction offenses are ad-
missible. For example, although driving under the influence of alcohol
or drugs is not a crime of moral turpitude in California, 8 a New York
defendant's credibility can be impeached with a misdemeanor conviction
of driving under the influence."°9 Other examples of crimes unlikely to
constitute moral turpitude in California, but which are admissible in
New York under the "individual self-interest" standard, include misde-
meanor convictions of criminal mischief,"1  resisting arrest,1  tres-
pass,112 disorderly conduct' 13 and prostitution.1 14 If Castro is overruled,
California may adopt the New York approach as a compromise between
104. Id.; see also People v. Stein, 97 A.D.2d 859, 859, 469 N.Y.S.2d 243, 245 (1983) (de-
fendant properly questioned about traffic offenses).
105. See supra notes 102-04 and accompanying text.
106. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
107. People v. Sandoval, 34 N.Y.2d 371, 377, 314 N.E.2d 413, 417, 357 N.Y.S.2d 849, 855
(1974).
108. Castro, 38 Cal. 3d at 315-16 n.10, 696 P.2d at 119-20 n.10, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 727-28
n.10; see Pinkins, 223 Cal. App. 3d at 69d.
109. People v. Galvin, 104 A.D.2d 527, 529, 479 N.Y.S.2d 896, 899 (1984). In People v.
McAleavey, the defendant was charged with driving under the influence (DUI). 133 Misc. 2d
987, 991-94, 509 N.Y.S.2d 278, 281-83 (N.Y. App. Term. 1986). The trial court allowed de-
fendant to be impeached with three DUI convictions, one of which was over seven years old.
Id. at 993-94, 509 N.Y.S.2d at 282-83. The appellate court held that DUI "bears logically and
reasonably on this issue of credibility... since it readily demonstrates a willingness to place
one's self interest ahead of the interests of society." Id. at 992, 509 N.Y.S.2d at 282. In
California, DUI convictions probably are inadmissible for impeachment. See supra note 108
and accompanying text.
110. See People v. Magee, 126 A.D.2d 573, 573-74, 510 N.Y.S.2d 690, 691 (1987).
111. See People v. Dare, 137 A.D.2d 866, 868, 524 N.Y.S.2d 547, 549 (1988); Magee, 126
A.D.2d at 573-74, 570 N.Y.S.2d at 691.
112. See People v. Roberts, 122 A.D.2d 436, 439, 505 N.Y.S.2d 452, 455 (1986), rev'd on
other grounds, 70 N.Y.2d 682, 512 N.E.2d 311, 518 N.Y.S.2d 790 (1987).
113. See People v. Guarino, 131 A.D.2d 875, 875, 517 N.Y.S.2d 231, 232 (1987).
114. See People v. Rhodes, 96 A.D.2d 565, 567, 465 N.Y.S.2d 249, 251-52 (1983).
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the rule allowing total admissibility of all prior convictions, and the
moral turpitude approach.
C. Extent of Cross-Examination About Prior Criminal Convictions
Another issue raised by the "Right to Truth-in-Evidence" provision
is the extent to which a defendant can be cross-examined respecting a
prior felony or misdemeanor conviction. Prior to Proposition 8, a wit-
ness could not be asked about the details of a prior crime.115 A witness,
however, could be asked the name of the conviction, the general nature
or elements of the conviction, the date of the conviction and the place of
the conviction. 1 6 A witness could also probably be asked about the sen-
tence he or she received as a result of the conviction.'
1 7
It should be noted, however, that there is no statute in California
which governs the scope of cross-examination as to a prior conviction.
Therefore, all limitations on the extent of cross-examination about prior
convictions are judicially created rules.11 ' The "Right to Truth-in-Evi-
dence" provision abrogates "judicially created ... rules restricting the
admission of relevant evidence in criminal cases."119 Although no Cali-
fornia case conclusively resolves this issue, it would appear that judicially
created rules limiting the extent of cross-examination about prior convic-
tions have been repealed. 120 This position is supported by a somewhat
115. People v. Terry, 38 Cal. App. 3d 432, 447, 113 Cal. Rptr. 233, 242 (1974) (improper
for prosecution to have asked finance company robbery defendant on cross whether two prior
robberies involved finance companies).
116. Id. The witness could be asked "about anything which would appear on the face of
the record of judgment since the record could itself be introduced into evidence for impeach-
ment." People v. McClellan, 71 Cal. 2d 793, 809, 457 P.2d 871, 882, 80 Cal. Rptr. 31, 42
(1969).
117. People v. Rodrigo, 69 Cal. 601, 605, 11 P. 481, 484 (1886) ("we entertain no doubt
that a party may ask a witness with respect to the fact of a judgment and sentence against him
for a felony"). This rule in Rodrigo is consistent with the national majority view under which
the witness can be asked about "the name of the crime committed... and the punishment
awarded." MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 43, at 98 (E. Cleary 3d ed. 1984); accord United
States v. Wolf, 561 F.2d 1376, 1381 (10th Cir. 1977) (dictum); United States v. Tumblin, 551
F.2d 1001, 1004 (5th Cir. 1977). But see People v. Smith, 63 Cal. 2d 779, 790-91, 409 P.2d
222, 230, 48 Cal. Rptr. 382, 390 (1966) (implying that witness can properly be cross-examined
about whether he served term of imprisonment, but not length of term). A good argument
could be made that the "Right to Truth-in-Evidence" provision overrules Smith, and brings
California law into conformity with the national majority view. See supra text accompanying
notes 38-44.
118. See 2 B. JEFFERSON, CALIFORNIA EVIDENCE BENCHBOOK § 28.8, at 924 (2d ed.
1982).
119. People v. Harris, 47 Cal. 3d 1047, 1081-82, 767 P.2d 619, 641,255 Cal. Rptr. 352, 374
(1989). See supra note 6 and accompanying text for a discussion of the "Right to Truth-in-
Evidence" provision.
120. Proposition 8 affects common law rules of evidence and evidentiary rules created by
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oblique discussion of this issue in dicta in People v. Thomas. 121 In
Thomas, the court addressed the issue of whether a defendant should be
allowed to present evidence regarding facts underlying his or her crimi-
nal conviction in order to explain or minimize the conviction.1 22 The
court observed:
[A]rguably any such explanation in the past would have contra-
vened Evidence Code section 787, rendering inadmissible evi-
dence of specific instances of conduct to support as well as to
attack the credibility of a witness. However, section 787 was
invalidated in criminal cases by another provision of the same
[Proposition 8] that broadened the use of prior convictions for
impeachment.
1 23
Thomas supports the conclusion that the "Right to Truth-in-Evi-
dence" provision brings California law into conformity with the law of
sister jurisdictions which allow a witness to be asked about the underly-
ing details of a prior conviction, subject to the court's discretion to ex-
clude such evidence if its prejudicial impact outweighs its probative
value. 124
For example, Louisiana recently enacted article 609.1 of its evidence
code,125 providing that a witness can be impeached with his prior convic-
tions.126 Article 609.1 also provides that the "details of the offense may
become admissible to show the true nature of the offense... [w]hen the
probative value thereof outweighs the danger of unfair prejudice, confu-
sion of the issues, or misleading the jury." 127 The rationale for this rule
the judicial exercise of supervisory powers over the courts. J. CHRISTIANSEN, PROPOSrTION 8:
A THREE-YEAR RETROSPECTIVE 27-35 (1985).
121. 206 Cal. App. 3d 689, 700-01 n.6, 254 Cal. Rptr. 15, 22-23 n.6 (1988).
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. See, e.g., Letwin, Impeaching Defendants with Their Prior Convictions Reconsidering
the Dangerous Propensities of Character Evidence After People v. Castro, 18 UCLA L. REV.
68(X), 717 (1985).
The rule prohibiting cross-examination about the underlying facts of a conviction has
been rejected by some jurisdictions because the bare fact of a conviction
is an abstraction bereft of detail, texture, color, and humanity. Without the contex-
tual qualifiers, the prior conviction is seen as facilitating the stereotypic treatment of
the defendant .... Relying on the abstract evidence of a conviction runs afoul of
hindsight we all share ... : the gross identification of an offense can mask vast
differences in the meaning of the underlying conduct and in its implications concern-
ing the actor's character.
Id.
125. LA. CODE EVID. ANN. art. 609.1 (West 1989).
126. Id.
127. Id.
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was explained in the case of State v. Tatum.128 The defendant in Tatum
admitted a prior conviction for possession of marijuana. 129 The prosecu-
tor probed further and asked, "[W]ere you initially charged with intent
to distribute marijuana... and you got yours reduced to simple posses-
sion?" 130 The defense claimed that this question was improper.1 31 The
court, however, ruled that "[s]ince it is the bad act and not the conviction
which is relevant to credibility, details of the bad act are also rele-
vant."132 Thus, cross-examination about the details of the prior convic-
tion in order to establish its true nature were proper.1 33
Other jurisdictions have allowed cross-examination about the details
of a prior conviction under the theory that a witness can be asked about
the underlying details of a prior conviction to the same extent he or she
can be cross-examined about uncharged misconduct evidencing lack of
credibility.1 34 The next section discusses the extent to which a witness
can be impeached with prior uncharged misconduct.
IV. THE IMPACT OF PROPOSITION 8 ON RULES REGARDING
IMPEACHMENT WITH UNCHARGED MISCONDUCT
One of the most significant impacts of Proposition 8 has been its
effect on the rules regarding impeachment of a witness with uncharged
misconduct. Prior to Proposition 8, California followed the rule of a
small minority of jurisdictions that specific instances of conduct could
not be used to impeach a witness's credibility unless such conduct re-
sulted in a felony conviction.13 5 This rule was codified in section 787 of
the Evidence Code.1 36  The California Supreme Court and a small
128. 506 So. 2d 584 (La. Ct. App. 1987).
129. Id at 590.
130. Id.
131. Id
132. Id
133. Id.
134. See, eg., State v. Murray, 310 N.C. 541, 551, 313 S.E.2d 523, 530 (1984) ("rather than
phrasing questions only in terms of convictions, the prosecutor may ask about the circum-
stances of a prior conviction in the same way he would ask about any specific misconduct");
People v. Jefferson, 136 A.D. 2d 655, 656, 523 N.Y.S.2d 887, 888 (1988) (questioning defend-
ant about the facts underlying prior conviction allowable "for the purpose of determining, at
least in general terms, what conduct gave rise to the conviction").
135. CAL. EVID. CODE § 787 (West 1966), repealed by People v. Harris, 47 Cal. 3d 1047,
1081, 767 P.2d 619, 640, 255 Cal. Rptr. 352, 373 (1985).
136. Id. Under the "Right to Truth-in-Evidence" provision, "evidence that a witness has
lied on an employment application, has cheated on school examinations, or has been unfaithful
to a spouse, and other similar evidence would be admissible." Mendez, California's New Law
on Character Evidence: Evidence Code Section 352 and the Impact of Recent Psychological
Studies, 31 UCLA L. REV. 1003, 1019 (1984).
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number of appellate courts have made it clear that the "Right to Truth-
in-Evidence" provision repeals section 787 in criminal cases; 137 however,
unresolved questions remain regarding what types of uncharged miscon-
duct are admissible for impeachment and whether extrinsic evidence of
uncharged misconduct is admissible if the witness denies the conduct on
cross-examination.
A. The California Cases
People v. Harris 13 stands for the proposition that the repeal of sec-
tion 787 of the California Evidence Code now permits the use of specific
instances of conduct to bolster a witness's credibility.139 Three appellate
court cases clarify that the repeal of section 787 also permits the use of
specific instances of conduct to attack a witness's credibility."4
In People v. Lankford, 4 ' the defendant was allowed to be cross-
examined about uncharged misconduct.14 2 There, the defendant was
charged with being an ex-felon in possession of a gun. 43 On direct ex-
amination the defendant testified that since leaving state prison, he had
"no incident yet since I've been out.""'4 By "incident," the defendant
meant conviction.145 On cross-examination, the prosecutor asked the de-
fendant about pending charges against him for robbery and assault.'46
The prosecutor asked, "Isn't it true, sir, that on the [second] day of Sep-
tember of this year, seven days from now, you are scheduled to stand
trial in this county for five counts of armed robbery and one count of
assault with a deadly weapon?"' 4 7 The defendant answered in the
affirmative. 148
Long before Proposition 8, the California Supreme Court prohibited
the type of cross-examination employed in Lankford under section 787,
137. See Harris, 47 Cal. 3d at 1081, 767 P.2d at 640, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 373; People v.
Bergschneider, 211 Cal. App. 3d 144, 259 Cal. Rptr. 219 (1989); People v. Adams, 198 Cal.
App. 3d 10, 243 Cal. Rptr. 580 (1988).
138. 47 Cal. 3d 1047, 767 P.2d 619, 255 Cal. Rptr. 352 (1989).
139. Id. at 1080-81, 767 P.2d at 640, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 373. But, see supra notes 76-97 and
accompanying text for a discussion of the repeal of section 787.
140. People v. Bergschneider, 211 Cal. App. 3d 144, 259 Cal. Rptr. 219 (1989); People v.
Lankford, 210 Cal. App. 3d 227, 258 Cal. Rptr. 322 (1989); People v. Adams, 198 Cal. App.
3d 10, 243 Cal. Rptr. 580 (1988).
141. 210 Cal. App. 3d 227, 258 Cal. Rptr. 322 (1989).
142. Id. at 232, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 324.
143. Id. at 231, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 323.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 232-33, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 324.
148. Id.
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making specific acts of misconduct inadmissible to attack or support
credibility. 149 Such cross-examination was improper even where defend-
ants were the first to raise the subject of their character, thereby "open-
ing the door" to cross-examination about bad character traits. 150
Nevertheless, the Lankford court reasoned that, under the "Right to
Truth-in-Evidence" provision, the old law disallowing such impeach-
ment evidence was no longer in effect, and the prosecutor's cross-exami-
nation was proper."' Prosecutors, however, should not interpret
Lankford so broadly as to suggest that they may always question a de-
fendant about pending charges, as opposed to the underlying conduct
which gave rise to those charges. In Lankford, the defendant "opened
the door" to cross-examination about his character by stating that he had
"no incident" since he had been out of prison. 2 Alternatively, the court
might have prohibited the prosecutor's subsequent questioning on this
point if the defendant had not opened the door to that line of
questioning.
1 53
In People v. Adams,1 14 it was the defense which sought to cross-
examine a witness on prior uncharged misconduct. 5 In Adams, the de-
fendant, charged with rape, alleged that the victim had consented to the
sexual acts in exchange for cocaine.'5 6 The defendant sought to show
that the victim had falsely accused others of rape in the past.15 7 The trial
court refused to allow such cross-examination, ruling that such evidence
was precluded by section 787.15 The appellate court overturned the
conviction, ruling that such evidence was made admissible by the "Right
to Truth-in-Evidence" provision.159 The court held that, because credi-
bility of the victim was the sole issue in the case, failure to admit the
evidence had resulted in a miscarriage of justice.1 0
149. See, eg., People v. Wagner, 13 Cal. 3d 612, 618, 532 P.2d 105, 108, 119 Cal. Rptr.
457, 460 (1975).
150. See id. at 618-19, 532 P.2d at 108, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 460 (1975) (prosecutor's cross-
examination of defendant about unconvicted acts concerning narcotics sales violated section
787 even after defendant testified at length as to his good character). The Lankford court
pointed out that Wagner is no longer good law because it predated Proposition 8. Lankford,
210 Cal. App. 3d at 235-36, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 326.
151. Lankford, 210 Cal. App. 3d at 240, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 329.
152. Id. at 232, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 324.
153. See id. at 239-40, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 329.
154. 198 Cal. App. 3d 10, 243 Cal. Rptr. 580 (1988).
155. Id. at 16, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 583.
156. Id. at 14-15, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 582.
157. Id. at 16, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 583.
158. Id. at 18-19, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 585.
159. Id. at 17-18, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 584.
160. Id. at 19, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 585. But see People v. Bittaker, 48 Cal. 3d 1046, 1097-98,
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In People v. Bergschneider,16 1 a prosecution witness introduced evi-
dence of prior uncharged misconduct, but the impeachment was properly
disallowed.162 In Bergschneider, a mother and stepfather were charged
with forcibly raping their fourteen-year old mentally retarded daugh-
ter.163 The prosecution called the daughter's boyfriend, who testified
that the mother had made incriminating statements to him. 16 The de-
fense sought to impeach the credibility of the victim's boyfriend with
evidence that he stole from his employer and thereafter lied about it.
16 1
Although the appellate court assumed that such evidence would be ad-
missible under the "Right to Truth-in-Evidence" provision, it also ruled
that the trial court properly exercised its discretion under section 352 of
the California Evidence Code166 to exclude such evidence on the ground
that its probative value was outweighed by its unduly prejudicial
effect.
167
Harris, Lankford, Adams and Bergschneider make it clear that evi-
dence of uncharged misconduct is admissible to impeach the credibility
of a witness, subject to the trial court's discretion to disallow overly prej-
udicial evidence under section 352.168 This rule probably allows cross-
774 P.2d 659, 688, 259 Cal. Rptr. 630, 659 (1989) (where no showing that previous accusations
of rape were false, trial court properly prohibited cross-examination of victim about them
under section 352).
161. 211 Cal. App. 3d 144, 259 Cal. Rptr. 219 (1989).
162. Id. at 165, 259 Cal. Rptr. at 231.
163. Id. at 150-51, 259 Cal. Rptr. at 221.
164. Id. at 164, 259 Cal. Rptr. at 231.
165. Id. at 165, 259 Cal. Rptr. at 231.
166. CAL. EVID. CODE § 352 (Vest 1966).
167. Bergschneider, 211 Cal. App. 3d at 164-65, 259 Cal. Rptr. at 230-31.
168. People v. Huntley, 46 Misc. 2d 209, 210, 259 N.Y.S.2d 369, 370 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1965)
(defendant who takes stand waives his fifth amendment privilege and may be interrogated
regarding prior convictions or any criminal act affecting his credibility); State v. Foster, 284
N.C. 259, 275, 200 S.E.2d 782, 794 (1973) (witness who elects to testify surrenders privilege
against self-incrimination respecting unconvicted misconduct). But see MCCORMICK ON EVI-
DENCE, supra note 117, § 42, at 92 (witness may be able to avoid answering questions about
uncharged misconduct by invoking fifth amendment privilege). California would undoubtedly
follow the authorities holding that witnesses cannot invoke the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion to avoid answering questions about uncharged misconduct. In People v. Thornton, the
California Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether a defendant can claim a fifth amend-
ment privilege when asked questions about uncharged misconduct. 11 Cal. 3d 738, 760, 523
P.2d 267, 281-82, 114 Cal. Rptr. 467, 481-82 (1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 924 (1975). There,
the defendant was charged with several sex offenses and was cross-examined about uncharged
acts for the purpose of establishing his identity as the perpetrator of the charged acts. Id. at
755, 523 P.2d at 272, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 472. The court held that:
A defendant who takes the stand to testify in his [or her] own behalf waives the
privilege against self-incrimination to the extent of the scope of relevant cross-exami-
nation. "It matters not that the defendant's answer on cross-examination might tend
to establish his guilt of a collateral offense for which he could still be prosecuted."
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examination on uncharged misconduct which resulted in acquittal, 16 9
and acts which only resulted in a juvenile conviction. 170 A more difficult
question posed by these four decisions, however, is the issue of the type
of uncharged misconduct which is admissible.
B. Types of Uncharged Misconduct Admissible
Under pre-Proposition 8 law, section 786 of the California Evidence
Code171 provided, "Evidence of traits of character other than honesty or
veracity or their opposites, is inadmissible to attack or support the credi-
bility of a witness." 172 In dicta, the court in People v. Harris 173 included
section 786 as one of the provisions of the evidence code that has been
repealed.174 If specific instances of uncharged misconduct are admissible
to attack credibility, and if section 786 has been repealed, then miscon-
duct not involving honesty or dishonesty would be admissible. But how
far may cross-examination about uncharged misconduct go? Other juris-
dictions may provide guidance to California courts.regarding the types of
uncharged misconduct which are admissible for impeachment. There are
three possible approaches that could be adopted in California.
1. Common-law approach
Under the traditional common-law approach followed by many ju-
risdictions, "on cross-examination a witness may, for the purposes of im-
Id. at 760-61, 523 P.2d at 282, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 482 (quoting Johnson v. United States, 318
U.S. 189, 192 (1943)). The Court also noted that, if the defendant refuses to answer, the jury
may be instructed to draw adverse inferences from this refusal. Id.; accord Air Et Chaleur v.
Janeway, 757 F.2d 489, 496 (2d Cir. 1985) (may be proper for jury to draw adverse inference
from a witness' refusal to answer particular question, claiming fifth amendment privilege).
169. Defendants can be impeached with an offense for which they were not convicted. See,
eg., State v. Royal, 300 N.C. 515, 525, 268 S.E.2d 517, 527 (1980). The "law is settled that
evidence of a prior offense, if otherwise relevant, is admissible against a defendant even though
he was tried and acquitted of the offense." 2 B. JEFFERSON, supra note 118, § 33.6, at 1201;
accord G. LILLY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 5.13, at 151 (1987) (use
of evidence of other crime in present trial should not be precluded by terms of result in unsuc-
cessful collateral prosecution).
170. It is proper to question a witness about the facts underlying a youthful offender adjudi-
cation, although the adjudication itself may not be used for impeachment. People v. Damon,
150 A.D.2d 479, 479-80, 541 N.Y.S.2d 82, 83 (1989); People v. Jackson, 79 Misc. 2d 814, 817-
18, 361 N.Y.S.2d 258, 262-63, (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1974). In California, it is not clear whether
Proposition 8 made juvenile convictions, as opposed to the facts underlying the convictions,
admissible for impeachment. See People v. Pitts, 223 Cal. App. 3d 1547, 1555, 273 Cal. Rptr.
389, 393-94 (1990).
171. CAL. EVID. CODE § 786 (West 1966).
172. Id.
173. 47 Cal. 3d 1047, 767 P.2d 619, 255 Cal. Rptr. 352 (1989).
174. Id. at 1081-82, 767 P.2d at 640, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 373.
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peachment, be asked [about] any particular or specific matter, act, or
thing which may affect his [or her] character and tend to show he [or
she] is unworthy of belief."' 175 This extremely liberal rule of cross-exami-
nation was justified under the theory that a witness's "general character"
is relevant to credibility.176 Before Proposition 8, California law had re-
jected the common-law approach and had limited character evidence to
attack or support credibility to the traits of "honesty or veracity, or their
opposites."1 77
For example, under the common-law approach, a witness may be
cross-examined about a wide variety of sexual misconduct which does
not directly relate to honesty or veracity, such as adultery, 178 living to-
gether out of wedlock, 7 9 and visiting houses of prostitution.'8 0 A wit-
ness can be cross-examined about sexually assaultive or brutal
behavior.' A witness can be cross-examined about his or her personal
associations such as knowingly associating with criminals8 2 and about
his or her residences and occupations.' 83 A witness can also be cross-
175. 98 C.J.S. Witnesses § 515 (1957); accord State v. Pittman, 731 S.W.2d 43, 48 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1987) (specific acts of either misconduct or immorality, which may or may not have been
basis of conviction, may be shown if specific misconduct discredits veracity of witness). Some
courts permit an attack upon character by fairly wide-open cross-examination about acts of
misconduct which show bad moral character and have only an attenuated relationship to cred-
ibility. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 117, § 42, at 90; see, e.g., Kelley v. State, 226
Ind. 148, 78 N.E.2d 547 (1948); People v. Sorge, 301 N.Y. 198, 93 N.E. 2d 637 (1950); People
v. Johnston, 228 N.Y. 332, 127 N.E. 186 (1920); State v. Jones, 215 Tenn. 206, 385 S.W.2d 80
(1964).
176. For example, in North Carolina a witness could be "impeached by evidence that his
general character is bad or it may be corroborated by evidence that it is good." Ingle v. Roy
Stone Transfer Corp., 271 N.C. 276, 279, 156 S.E.2d 265, 268 (1967). Such impeachment was
not limited to acts involving moral turpitude or bad acts resulting in convictions. Id. at 280,
156 S.E.2d at 268-69; Manning, Impeachment: The Dilemma of the Defendant-Witness in
North Carolina, 13 N.C. CENT. L.J. 35, 37 (1981). North Carolina has since adopted Federal
Rule of Evidence 608, FED. R. EVID. 608, which limits cross-examination concerning acts of
misconduct as an attack upon character to acts which have some relation to the truthfulness or
untruthfulness of the witness. See N.C. GEN. STAT. ch. 8c, rule 608 (1990).
177. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 786 (West 1966).
178. May v. State, 254 Ark. 194, 196-97, 492 S.W.2d 888, 889, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1024
(1973). Arkansas has since adopted the federal approach. See ARK. R. EVID. 608.
179. State v. Blocker, 278 S.W. 1014, 1015-16 (Mo. 1925).
180. People v. Fenner, 217 Mich. 239, 241, 185 N.W. 806, 807 (1921). Michigan has since
adopted the federal approach. See MICH. R. EVID. 608.
181. State v. Caruthers, 676 S.W.2d 935, 941 (Tenn. 1984) (questioning defendant about
prior uncharged misconduct involving driving female and her male companion around, putting
male companion in trunk, and raping and beating female relevant to credibility), cert. denied,
469 U.S. 1197 (1985).
182. See Walker v. State, 246 Ind. 386, 395, 204 N.E.2d 850, 855 (1964) (questions about
defendant's previous criminal associations deemed proper), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 991 (1966).
183. E.g., Jutson v. State, 213 Ark. 884, 196, 209 S.W.2d 681, 682 (1948) (cross-examina-
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examined about his or her political associations, such as Communist
Party membership, 184 or lack of loyalty to the government. 85
Although most jurisdictions have abandoned the common-law ap-
proach186 in favor of the federal approach, 18 7 one notable exception is
New York. In New York, the law regarding the admissibility of prior
convictions for impeachment is identical to the law regarding the admis-
sibility of uncharged misconduct for impeachment.' 188 Under New York
law, uncharged misconduct is admissible evidence of credibility if it
shows a defendant's propensity to place his or her own interest above
those of society. 18 9 This rule allows a wide range of cross-examination of
a witness on a variety of uncharged misconduct.
For example, in People v. Calvin of Oakknoll,190 the defendant was
charged with second-degree murder.191 Specifically, he was charged with
shooting a hunter after questioning him about hunting on private prop-
erty.' 92 The court permitted the prosecutor to cross-examine the defend-
ant on two completely unrelated incidents.' 93 In one incident, the
defendant brandished a rifle, blocking the path of a woman and her chil-
dren who were returning home from church.' 94 In the second situation,
the defendant fired shots at two hunters as they were driving past his
house. 195
The appellate court ruled that both incidents "revealed a willingness
or disposition on the part of the defendant to place the advancement of
his self-interest ahead of principle and the interests of society."' 196 There-
fore, the court held that the incidents were properly admitted for im-
tion touching on witness' residence, occupation, and associations as affecting his credibility
was proper). Arkansas now follows the federal approach. See ARK. R. EvID. 608(b).
184. Fawick Airflex Co. v. United Elec. Radio & Machine Workers Local 735, 87 Ohio
App. 371, 389, 92 N.E.2d 436, 445 (1950). Ohio now follows a variant of Federal Rule of
Evidence 608(b). See OHIO R. EVID. 608(b).
185. Commonwealth v. Sacco, 255 Mass. 369, 438-39, 151 N.E. 839, 856 (1926).
186. Under this approach only misconduct relating to honesty or veracity is admissible.
MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 117, § 42, at 90; see supra note 186.
187. Under the federal approach, only misconduct relating to the credibility of the witness
is admissible. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 117, § 42, at 90.
188. People v. Sandoval, 34 N.Y.2d 371, 377, 314 N.E.2d 413, 417, 357 N.Y.S.2d 849, 855
(1974). See supra notes 106-14 and accompanying text for a discussion of New York law
regarding the admissability of prior convictions for impeachment.
189. Sandoval, 34 N.Y.2d at 377, 357 N.Y.S.2d at 855, 314 N.E.2d at 417.
190. 110 A.D.2d 1044, 489 N.Y.S.2d 132 (1985).
191. Id. at 1045, 489 N.Y.S.2d at 133.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id., 489 N.Y.S.2d at 133-34.
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peachment even though they involved conduct similar to that for which
the defendant stood trial.
197
A witness in New York can be questioned about uncharged miscon-
duct involving vicious acts such as threats to use violence 98 or giving an
elderly woman a drink containing five valium tablets.199 A witness can
be questioned about immoral conduct such as his or her lascivious dispo-
sition,20" adultery,201 management of a brothel20 2 or selling drugs to
children.20 3 A witness can also be cross-examined about dishonest con-
duct such as paying employees "off the books," non-payment of income
taxes" or illegal entry into the country.20 5
The common-law approach, as applied in New York, of broad ad-
missibility and wide-open cross-examination appears consistent with the
purpose of Proposition 8 in California. Proposition 8 intended to make
all relevant evidence admissible to the greatest extent possible.20 6 Conse-
quently, the common-law approach should be followed in California be-
cause it is concurrent with the intent of Proposition 8.207
2. Federal approach
The federal approach on cross-examination with uncharged miscon-
duct is codified in section 608(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence, which
provides:
Specific instances of the conduct of a witness for the purposes
of attacking or supporting the witness' credibility, other than
conviction of a crime as provided for in [section] 609, may not
be proved by extrinsic evidence. They may, however, in the
discretion of the court, if probative of truthfulness or untruth-
fulness, be inquired into on cross-examination of the witness (1)
concerning the witness' character for truthfulness or untruth-
fulness, or (2) concerning the character for truthfulness or un-
197. Id., 489 N.Y.S.2d at 134.
198. See People v. Jeudi, 139 A.D.2d 594, 594, 527 N.Y.S.2d 254, 255 (1988).
199. See People v. Dukett, 110 A.D.2d 940, 941, 487 N.Y.S.2d 875, 876 (1987).
200. See People v. Weeks, 126 A.D.2d 857, 860, 510 N.Y.S.2d 920, 922-23 (1987).
201. People v. Rouse, 142 A.D.2d 788, 789, 530 N.Y.S.2d 333, 334 (1988).
202. People v. Roth, 139 A.D.2d 605, 608, 527 N.Y.S.2d 97, 101 (1988).
203. See People v. Stewart, 92 A.D.2d 226, 229, 459 N.Y.S.2d 853, 855 (1983).
204. See People v. Charkow, 142 A.D.2d 734, 734-35, 531 N.Y.S.2d 120, 121 (1988).
205. See People v. Codner, 134 A.D.2d 272, 273, 520 N.Y.S.2d 605, 606 (1987).
206. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28(d).
207. This view was shared by the Assembly Committee on Criminal Justice, which con-
cluded that Proposition 8 would permit attorneys to attack the character of a witness by claim-
ing, for example, that the witness "was a drunk or a womanizer, in an attempt to have the jury
disbelieve his testimony." ASSEMBLY COMM. ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 38, at 12.
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truthfulness of another witness as to which character the
witness being cross-examined has testified.
The giving of testimony, whether by an accused or by any
other witness, does not operate as a waiver of the accused's or
the witness' privilege against self-incrimination when examined
with respect to matters which relate only to credibility.0 8
The federal approach is considerably more restrictive than the
common-law approach because it limits the admissibility of evidence of
uncharged misconduct to acts relating to "truthfulness or untruthful-
ness." 2" The federal approach is also consistent with the pre-Proposi-
tion 8 rule codified in section 786 of the California Evidence Code which
limited admissibility of character evidence to traits of character involving
"honesty or veracity, or their opposites."21 0 Nevertheless, even under
the federal approach, a wide range of misconduct is admissible for
impeachment.
Under the federal approach, a witness can be asked about his or her
disbarment from the practice of law,"' and the attendant disciplinary
proceedings.2" 2 Similarly, a witness can be cross-examined about suspen-
sion of his or her chiropractor's license.2" 3 Even evidence that police
officers, who were defense witnesses, had been suspended from the police
force for misconduct on an unrelated occasion was admissible for
impeachment.214
Misconduct involving theft or fraud is also admissible.21 - For exam-
ple, a defendant judge's misuse of judicial defendant-bond funds was a
permissible topic for cross-examination. 1 6 The misappropriation of
208. FED. R. EVID. 608(b).
209. See id.
210. CAL. EVID. CODE § 786 (West 1966).
211. United States v. Weichert, 783 F.2d 23, 25 (2d Cir.) (disbarment 12 years before trial
admissible), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 831 (1986).
212. United States v. Whitehead, 618 F.2d 523, 528-29 (4th Cir. 1980).
213. United States v. Fulk, 816 F.2d 1202, 1206 (7th Cir. 1987).
214. United States v. Rios Ruiz, 579 F.2d 670, 672-74 (1st Cir. 1978).
215. United States v. Qaoud, 777 F.2d 1105, 1112-13 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S.
1098 (1986).
216. Id. Similarly, the prosecution properly impeached the defendant, a disbarred attorney,
by cross-examining him about uncharged acts of misappropriation of clients funds 14 years
earlier. Id. at 1112. Moreover, impeaching the defendant with his signed statement admitting
such misconduct was proper and did not violate the rule against impeachment with extrinsic
evidence on collateral issues. Id. at 1448-49; accord State v. Martin, 201 Conn. 74, 83-89, 513
A.2d 116, 123-24 (1986) (trial court erred in failing to consider admissibility of uncharged
misconduct involving theft). See infra notes 235-47 and accompanying text for a discussion of
the admissibility of extrinsic evidence.
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stock in a private placement was admissible,217 as was evidence of un-
charged acts of insurance fraud.218
A wide variety of misconduct involving false statements is admissi-
ble. Courts have allowed cross-examination on falsely filling out an ap-
plication for a credit card219 and a car dealership license.220 One court
even allowed impeachment evidence regarding a witness giving his em-
ployer a false excuse for his absence from work.221 Another court held it
was proper to cross-examine a witness about his concealment of the true
reasons his girlfriend left him.2 22
Parole generally involves the release of a prisoner from confinement
upon his or her promise to observe certain terms and conditions. There-
fore, a violation of parole constitutes a failure to keep one's word, and "is
almost always 'probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness.' "223 Inas-
much as the use of false names is probative of a lack of veracity, a witness
can be questioned on the use of aliases.224
A witness may also be cross-examined about dishonesty in connec-
tion with prior judicial proceedings. A prosecutor properly cross-ex-
amined a defense expert about whether on a prior occasion his testimony
was criticized by the trial judge.225 A prosecutor properly asked a de-
fendant whether a judge in a deportation hearing had found his testi-
mony not credible.226 A defendant's admission that he faked insanity at
an earlier unrelated trial was also held admissible.22 7
217. United States v. Smith, 727 F.2d 214, 221 (2d Cir. 1984).
218. United States v. Amahia, 825 F.2d 177, 180-81 (8th Cir. 1987).
219. United States v. Sperling, 726 F.2d 69, 75 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 467 U.S. 1243 (1984).
220. United States v. Carlin, 698 F.2d 1133, 1137 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 958
(1983).
221. United States v. Cole, 617 F.2d 151, 153-54 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 918
(1980).
222. State v. Estrada, 69 Haw. 204, 214, 738 P.2d 812, 823 (1987). The Hawaii Supreme
Court also ruled that the witness could properly be cross-examined about deceptive statements
he placed on an employment application. Id.
223. State v. Greer, 39 Ohio St. 3d 236, 243, 530 N.E.2d 382, 393-94 (1988).
224. McKinnon v. State, 287 Ark. 1, 2-3, 695 S.W.2d 826, 826 (1985) (" 'If a man [or
woman] lies about his [or her] own name, might he [or she] not tell other lies?"' (quoting Lyda
v. United States, 321 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1963))); State v. Dolphin, 195 Conn. 444, 458-59, 488
A.2d 812, 821 (cross examination, under rule identical to federal approach, of defense witness
about use of aliases, having been wanted by police, and "having once been erroneously re-
ported as dead after swimming in the Connecticut River," was proper), cert. denied, 474 U.S.
833 (1985).
225. United States v. Terry, 702 F.2d 299, 316 (2d Cir. 1983) (previous court finding that
defense expert "guessed under oath" was permissible topic for cross examination under rule
608(b)).
226. United States v. Bagaric, 706 F.2d 42, 65 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 840 (1983).
227. United States v. Covelli, 738 F.2d 847, 856 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 867
(1984).
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The federal approach is more restrictive than the common-law ap-
proach. If California follows this approach, federal cases which allow
impeachment using uncharged misconduct would become persuasive au-
thority for California courts. Federal cases which have held that certain
misconduct was inadmissible may not, however, necessarily be persuasive
authority in California because California's standard for admissibility is
more liberal than the federal standard.28
3. Moral turpitude approach
As a possible compromise between the liberal common-law ap-
proach and the more restrictive federal approach, California could adopt
a rule that only misconduct evidencing moral turpitude is admissible.
While no California case law on the issue exists, a plausible argument
could be made to support this approach.
In People v. Castro,229 the California Supreme Court ruled that the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment2 30 restricts the admissi-
bility of impeachment evidence to conduct demonstrating "moral turpi-
tude."2 3 ' Although Castro dealt with prior convictions and not
uncharged misconduct, 232 its reasoning should apply equally to un-
charged misconduct. Overwhelming authority in other jurisdictions,
however, holds that due process does not restrict states from deciding
their own rules of evidence, and no constitutional considerations limit
the type of impeachment evidence.233 Therefore, not only is it unlikely
that the California Supreme Court would extend Castro's ruling to cover
the admissibility of uncharged misconduct, but Castro itself may soon be
overturned. 234 Hence, the court might adopt the common-law approach
for California.
C. Admissibility of Extrinsic Evidence
Currently, California follows the national majority view under
which a witness can be cross-examined about specific instances of un-
228. See supra notes 175-207 and accompanying text for a discussion of California's liberal
admissibility standard and supra notes 208-28 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
more restrictive federal standard.
229. 38 Cal. 3d 301, 696 P.2d 111, 211 Cal. Rptr. 719 (1985).
230. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
231. Castro, 38 Cal. 3d at 313-16, 696 P.2d at 118-20, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 725-28.
232. Id. at 305, 696 P.2d at 112, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 720.
233. See supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text for examples of jurisdictions that have
no constitutional limitations on the type of admissible impeachment evidence.
234. See supra note 74 and accompanying text explaining the changed composition of the
California Supreme Court.
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charged misconduct to attack his or her credibility.235 It is unclear, how-
ever, the extent to which California courts will apply the traditional
common-law rule prohibiting the admission of extrinsic evidence to
prove uncharged misconduct.236
Jurisdictions that allow a witness to be examined about specific acts
to attack credibility impose the restriction on such evidence codified in
Federal Rule of Evidence 608(b).237 That rule provides, in pertinent
part, that "specific instances of the conduct of a witness, for the purpose
of attacking or supporting the witness' credibility, other than conviction
of a crime ... may not be proved by extrinsic evidence. '231 In other
words, a witness may be examined about specific acts to support or at-
tack his or her credibility, but, if the witness denies such acts, the exam-
iner must "take his [or her] answer," and no other witnesses can be
called to prove such acts.239
The California Supreme Court's decision in People v. Harris,2" im-
plies that the prohibition on extrinsic evidence may not be followed in
California. In Harris, the prosecution offered specific instances of a wit-
ness's past reliability to support his credibility.24 1 This was done, how-
ever, through the use of extrinsic evidence-the testimony of a police
officer who worked with the informant in prior cases.242 Such extrinsic
evidence clearly would have been inadmissible under Federal Rule of Ev-
idence 608(b). 243 The California Supreme Court, however, held that the
evidence was admissible under the "Right to Truth-in-Evidence" provi-
sion. 2' Thus, the ratio decidendi of Harris is that the extrinsic evidence
235. See supra notes 135-70 and accompanying text.
236. This rule against extrinsic evidence of specific acts to attack or support credibility is
traceable to the early eighteenth century. 3 B. Wrr1UN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE § 1982, at
139 (3d ed. 1986). The policies justifying the rule are the avoidance of unfair surprise and
confusion of issues. People v. Castro, 38 Cal. 3d 301, 316, 696 P.2d 111, 120, 211 Cal. Rptr.
719, 728 (1985). These policies have no effect in forbidding cross-examination about specific
acts because (1) there is no danger of confusion of the issues, as the matter stops with question
and answer, and (2) there is no danger of unfair surprise, as the impeached witness is not
obliged to be ready with other witnesses to answer the extrinsic evidence since there is none to
be answered, and the witness can be expected to know and answer his own deeds. 3A J.
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW §§ 979-981, at 823-38 (J. Chadbourn rev.
ed. 1970).
237. See FED. R. EVID. 608(b); supra note 209 and accompanying text.
238. FED. R. EVID. 608(b).
239. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 117, § 42, at 92.
240. 47 Cal. 3d 1047, 767 P.2d 619, 255 Cal. Rptr. 352 (1989).
241. Id. at 1080, 767 P.2d at 640, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 373.
242, Id.
243. See supra note 208 and accompanying text.
244. Harris, 47 Cal. 3d at 1080-83, 767 P.2d at 640-41, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 372-75; CAL.
CONsT. art. I, § 28(d).
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 24:621
prohibition is inapplicable in California,2 45 and that extrinsic evidence is
admissible subject to the trial court's discretion to limit such evidence
under section 352 of the California Evidence Code.24 6 Unlike the other
evidentiary prohibitions eliminated by Proposition 8, this change repre-
sents a slight departure from the laws of other common-law
jurisdictions.247
V. CONCLUSION
The pre-Proposition 8 rule regarding admissibility of prior miscon-
duct evidence for impeachment has been replaced with Proposition 8,
allowing broad trial court discretion to admit virtually any prior miscon-
duct evidence under section 352 of the California Evidence Code. Under
this approach, both moral turpitude felony and misdemeanor convictions
are admissible. Uncharged misconduct is also admissible as long as it is
relevant to credibility. However, the exact approach which California
appellate courts will adopt governing the admissibility of uncharged mis-
conduct evidence is not yet clear. Fortunately, California can turn to the
laws of other jurisdictions for guidance. Although California criminal
law practitioners may regard the changes brought about by Proposition 8
as revolutionary, in reality, the most revolutionary impact of Proposition
8 is simply to bring California law into conformity with that of most
other jurisdictions.
245. Harris, 47 Cal. 3d at 1081, 767 P.2d at 640, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 373.
246. CAL. EVID. CODE § 352 (West 1966). Prior to the enactment of the California Evi-
dence Code, California did follow an extrinsic evidence rule prohibiting the introduction of
extrinsic evidence to prove that a witness testified falsely as to a collateral matter. See People
v. Dye, 75 Cal. 108, 112 (1888); People v. Webb, 70 Cal. 120, 121 (1886); 3 B. WITKIN, supra
note 236, § 1982, at 1939. Witkin, however, concludes that this rule was abolished when the
California Evidence Code was enacted in favor of a rule allowing extrinsic evidence subject to
the trial court's discretion. Id. § 1983, at 1939-41.
No other jurisdiction follows the rule, which now appears to be the law in California, that
extrinsic evidence of specific acts of conduct is admissible to attack or support credibility. See
supra notes 244-45 and accompanying text. Nevertheless, it is possible to fashion a test for
courts to use in determining the admissibility of extrinsic evidence under section 352. Courts
should consider: (1) the danger of confusing the issues and consumption of time; (2) the extent
to which the party whose witness is being impeached either knew or reasonably should have
known about the evidence of the prior specific acts; (3) the degree to which the act relates to
credibility; (4) how long ago the act occurred; (5) whether, in the case of impeaching the
defendant, the act was for the same offense for which defendant was charged; and (6) whether
the admission of the act would discourage defendant from testifying. The first two prongs of
this test are based on the policies justifying the rule excluding extrinsic evidence. See supra
note 140. The remaining prongs to the test are based on People v. Beagle, 6 Cal. 3d 441, 453,
492 P.2d 1, 8, 99 Cal. Rptr. 313, 320 (1972). See supra notes 235-47 and accompanying text
for a discussion of admissibility of extrinsic evidence.
247. See supra notes 244-46.
April 1991] IMPEACHMENT WITH UNCHARGED MISCONDUCT 653
When California voters enacted Proposition 8, they intended to cor-
rect "a perceived imbalance in favor of defendants in the rules regarding
the admissibility of evidence.""24 Whether Proposition 8, as interpreted
by appellate courts, will fulfill this goal while preserving a defendant's
right to a fair trial, however, remains to be seen.
248. People v. Taylor, 180 Cal. App. 3d 622, 632, 225 Cal. Rptr. 733, 738 (1986).
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